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The FBI’s Fitness Tests and Title VII—Does Gender Equality 
Require Lowering Standards? 
BY DYLAN TUCKER* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Many careers require specific abilities, ranging from intellectual to physical. 
Thus, prior to entry into a given position, employers often train and/or test new 
recruits to ensure that they have the requisite abilities to perform the job or 
complete training without injury. Gender-norming is a process by which 
employers allow an applicant’s sex to impact their scores on an employment test.1 
This norming is used to account for the inherent differences between the sexes. 
However, because such norming is likely to violate Title VII, agencies that 
implement gender-norming standards in their employment testing often adopt 
these tests as a mechanism to determine overall fitness, rather than establish 
gender-normed abilities as a minimum requirement necessary to do the job. 
In 2009, the FBI held a 22-week new agent training program (“NATP”) in 
Quantico, Virginia, which set out not only to prepare new agents for their new 
careers in the FBI, but also to limit injury during the physical training.2 The NATP 
subjected new agent trainees (“NAT”) to a physical fitness test (“PFT”), to ensure 
that the trainees were at a sufficient overall fitness level.3 After failing to 
successfully complete the push-up requirement, where male NATs were required 
to perform more push-ups than female NATs, Jay Bauer filed a Title VII action 
against the Attorney General.4 The primary claim was that the gender-normed 
standards of the PFT were facially discriminatory under two Title VII provisions.5 
At trial, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.6 The district 
court agreed that the physical fitness test was facially discriminatory, relying 
heavily on the “simple test” outlined in City of Los Angeles Department of Water & 
Power v. Manhart as well as the plain language of Title VII.7 However, on appeal, 
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 1.  Alan Andrews & Julie Risher, What does THAT have to do with being a cop?, AELE.ORG (Oct. 14, 
2006), http://www.aele.org/andrews2006.pdf. 
 2.  So Close Yet So Far: One Failed Push Up Has Potential to Change FBI’s Fitness Test, ABA.ORG (Feb. 
22, 2016), https://apps.americanbar.org/ababoards/blog/blogpost.cfm?threadid=32832&catid=14913. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), 2000e-2(1). 
 6.  Bauer v. Holder, 25 F. Supp. 3d 842, 850 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated sub nom. Bauer v. Lynch, 812 
F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 7.  Id. at 855–56. 
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the court vacated and remanded the district court’s decision due to a perceived 
error in legal analysis.8 The Fourth Circuit held that the question to consider on 
remand was whether the PFT, in light of inherent physiological differences, placed 
an “unequal burden” on an individual based on sex.9 Subsequently, on remand, 
the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the FBI, 
reasoning that the PFT did not impose an “unequal burden” on male NATs.10 
Part I will discuss Title VII and relevant case law dealing with gender-normed 
standards and testing. This section will outline the “simple test” used by some 
courts in gender-norming cases. The examination will focus on how courts look 
exclusively to the plain language used in Title VII and rely on “formal equality” to 
determine whether a policy is discriminatory. Moreover, examination of the 
“simple test” will underscore the lens through which the district court in Bauer v. 
Holder viewed the facts and will explore the implications of analyzing gender-
normed fitness testing policies in this way.  Part I will also discuss the origins and 
uses of the alternative “unequal burden” analysis employed by several courts, 
including the Fourth Circuit in Bauer v Lynch. This approach avoids interpreting 
Title VII as disallowing all differential standards outright, but rather interprets 
Title VII as disallowing differential standards that place “unequal burdens” on an 
individual based on sex. 
Next, Part II will fully outline the facts and procedural history of Bauer as well 
as underline the arguments asserted by both parties at the district court and 
appeals court levels. Part III will provide an analysis of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, 
and the implications it will have moving forward. Specifically, the focus will lie on 
the ambiguity left by the Fourth Circuit in how to define and analyze the term 
“burden” in gender-normed fitness testing cases.  Additionally, this part will 
discuss the outcome of the case on remand and how that outcome could ease 
liability concerns for other employers. Lastly, Part IV will conclude with a 
summary of the article and a discussion on the possible future implications that 
the holding of Bauer might have for gender-based employment testing.   
I. TITLE VII AND SEX 
Established in 1964, Title VII protects against unlawful discrimination in the 
employment context by mandating that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting 
employees or applicants for employment . . . shall be made free from any 
discrimination based on . . . sex.”11 In efforts to further increase employee 
protections, Title VII was amended through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, stating 
that “discriminatory use of test scores” as well as use of “different cutoff scores” 
for different groups on “employment related tests” is strictly forbidden.12 Courts 
have recognized two variations of discrimination—disparate impact and disparate 
treatment. The focus of this paper will remain with the latter. Disparate treatment 
 
 8.  Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d at 351–52.  
 9.  Supra note 2. 
 10.  Bauer v. Sessions, No. 1:13 –cv–93 WL 2311748, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Va. May 25, 2017). 
 11.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, TIT. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (2012)). 
 12.  Fourth Circuit Applies “Unequal Burdens” Analysis to Gender-Normed Fitness Test, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 2257, 2257 (June 10, 2016). 
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occurs when an employer’s policy facially discriminates against certain employees 
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.13 Moreover, while 
evidence of discriminatory motive is important to a disparate treatment claim, 
such a motive can sometimes be inferred from the simple fact of difference in 
treatment:14 “[W]hether an employment practice involves disparate treatment 
through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer 
discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination.”15 
The issue that arises in Bauer is whether unlawful disparate treatment 
automatically arises when males and females are required to meet different marks 
(for example, thirty push-ups versus fourteen push-ups), or if reaching different 
marks may nevertheless represent the same level of achievement. In other words, 
the courts grapple with interpreting Title VII to require formal equality (requiring 
men and women to perform the same number of push-ups), or interpreting it in a 
way that allows for a more pragmatic understanding of equality through 
consideration of inherent physiological differences between sexes. 
A. Foundational Cases 
1. The “Simple Test” 
While Bauer presents a relatively novel situation—gender-normed standards 
for employment fitness tests—there are several cases that helped lay the 
foundation for how the district court and court of appeals analyzed this case. The 
“simple test” for determining discrimination under Title VII was developed in 
Manhart.16 This case involved a class action filed on behalf of female employees, 
contending that the employer’s requirement that female employees make larger 
contributions to its pension fund than male employees violated Title VII.17 The 
employer used mortality tables showing that females lived longer than males, and 
thus made females contribute extra based on the assumption that it would be more 
costly to cover their retirement.18 The Court noted that while relying on sex 
stereotypes to make employment decisions is unlawful under Title VII, this case 
presented a different situation.19 That is, it was a fact that women, as a class, lived 
longer than men.20 Importantly, however, the Court reasoned that not all women 
in the class will live longer than every male employee, and therefore, it is unlawful 
to make gender-based policies based on average lifespan differences. In making 
its determination, the Court employed a “simple test,” looking at the plain 
language of Title VII and the legislative intent: “such a practice does not pass the 
simple test of whether the evidence shows treatment of a person in a manner 
 
 13.  Elements and burdens of proof—Disparate treatment and disparate impact distinguished, OH. EMPL. 
PRAC. L. § 19:2 (2016). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Bauer v. Holder, 25 F. Supp. 3d 842, 856 (E.D. Va. 2014) (quoting Int’l Union, United Auto., 
Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991)). 
 16.  See generally Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 17.  Id. at 705. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 707. 
 20.  Id. 
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which but for that person’s sex would be different.”21 In other words, the simple 
fact that females were being treated unequally pointed to a violation of Title VII. 
Moreover, the court felt that no further analysis was needed and the fact that 
females, on average, lived longer than males made no difference to the 
determination. 
Although the facts in Manhart are not on point with the facts in Bauer, the 
Court nevertheless provided a framework with which to interpret and apply Title 
VII in cases where employers treat male and female employees differently based 
on identifiable differences between them. As such, when examining the facts in 
Bauer, the district court analogized the FBI’s claim that different push-up 
requirements were needed because of the inherent differences between the sexes 
to the “life-expectancy” rationale used by the employer in Manhart. Under this 
more formal approach to equality, the district court was able to avoid considering 
physiological differences between the sexes, and instead stopped the analysis at 
the simple fact that men and women needed different scores to pass the PFT. 
2. “Unequal Burdens” 
Providing some nuance to the “simple test,” however, Gerdom v. Continental 
Airlines, Inc. established the “unequal burdens” test for Title VII violations. Here, 
flight attendants were required to remain under a certain weight in order to 
maintain employment.22 For example, an attendant five feet two inches tall could 
weigh no more than 114 pounds.23 Moreover, all flight attendants were weighed 
once a month to make sure they met the weight requirement.24 If an attendant was 
overweight, she would be required to lose two pounds per week.25 Failing to do 
so would lead to suspension and eventually termination.26 The majority held that 
the plaintiffs could show that they had been treated discriminatorily due to their 
sex if, upon remand, they could establish that men similarly situated had not been 
subjected to comparable burdens.27 Thus, here, the court emphasized the fact that 
different may not mean unequal, as there are inherent distinctions between the 
sexes. As such, the true measure of discrimination in these types of cases is the sex-
based burdens that employment policies place on employees. 
The desire to limit discrimination is a central tenant of the modern judicial 
system. However, tension arises when courts must balance the seemingly plain 
and strict language of Title VII with the often complex nature of inter-gender 
differences. Employing the “simple test” allows courts to bypass considerations 
about physical differences between men and women, holding gender-normed 
physical fitness tests facially discriminatory. However, the “unequal burdens” test 
allows courts to take a more substantive approach to equality, by providing a 
mechanism to take note of identifiable differences between men and women. Such 
approaches make room for gender-normed physical fitness testing, so long as they 
 
 21.  Id. at 711. 
 22.  Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 605. 
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pose no greater burden on either sex. This tension between following the arguably 
plain and strict language of Title VII and acknowledging that different standards 
may be necessary to avoid true discrimination lies at the center of Bauer litigation. 
B. The FBI’s History of Similar Tests and Litigation 
While few cases touch on the precise issue outlined in Bauer, the FBI has faced 
litigation over the PFT before.  In Powell v. Reno, a male NAT also alleged that the 
different physical fitness standards in the NATP were facially discriminatory 
towards men.28 The plaintiff asserted that he might have passed the PFT if the FBI 
did not have gender-normed performance standards.29 However, the court 
disagreed with the plaintiff’s contention that the different standards violated Title 
VII.30 The court, relying on Gerdom, held that Title VII allows employers to make 
distinctions based on inherent and clearly identifiable physical differences 
between men and women.31 In other words, gender-normed policies where “no 
significantly greater burden of compliance was imposed on either sex” are 
permissible under Title VII.32 The court went on to note that its decision is rooted 
in Supreme Court precedent. The court cites Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma 
County, noting that it “has consistently upheld statutes where the gender 
classification . . . realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly 
situated in certain circumstances.”33 Moreover, for further support, the court 
looked to dicta in United States v. Virginia, which underscored the idea that 
admission of women to the previously all-male Virginia Military Institute would 
require the school to “adjust aspects of the physical training programs.”34 
The court in Powell reasoned that men and women are not “similarly 
situated” physically.35 Keeping this in mind, men and women at equal fitness 
levels may nevertheless perform differently on physical fitness tests. For example, 
the court notes that women have, on average, less upper body strength than men.36 
As such, women may not be able to perform the same number of push-ups as 
men—at least not without extra time or training.37 After taking these differences 
into account, the court deemed that the requirements for males were comparably 
equal and no more burdensome than those for females.38 
In addition to Powell, the FBI faced yet another allegation in Hale v. Holder—a 
proceeding before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.39 Here, 
similar to in Powell, the plaintiff was a male NAT and also failed to satisfy the PFT 
 
 28.  Powell v. Reno, No. 96-2743, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24169, at *9 (D.D.C. July 24, 1997). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at *9–10. 
 32.  Gerdom 692 F.2d at 606. 
 33.  Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981). 
 34.   See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550–51 n.19 (1996).   
 35.  See Powell, No. 96-2743, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24169, at *9–11. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Hale v. Holder, No. 570-2007-00423x (E.E.O.C. Sept. 20, 2010). 
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standards.40 Plaintiff alleged that the FBI held female trainees to a lower physical 
standard than the male trainees, thus violating Title VII.41  However, the 
administrative law judge disagreed, adopting the approach taken by 
the Powell court. The judge emphasized the basic physical differences between the 
genders, and held that the FBI’s recognition of those differences does not violate 
Title VII.42 Moreover, the judge found that the PFT was not unequally burdensome 
because it, “(1) screened out individuals of both genders who were not sufficiently 
fit to safely perform the duties of [a Special Agent]; and (2) did not screen out 
individuals of either gender who were sufficiently fit to safely perform as [a 
Special Agent].”43 
These cases, while not binding precedent, provided some guidance to the 
district and appeals courts in Bauer. Moreover, while previous cases establish a 
framework to analyze gender-norming cases, they do not provide a specific 
outline for cases dealing with gender-normed physical fitness tests. As such, 
Powell and Hale provide the best predictor of the analytical approach that future 
courts will, and should, take. 
II. BAUER V. LYNCH: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Case Facts 
In 2008, Jay Bauer applied to the FBI, and passed the initial written tests and 
background checks.44 However, in addition to the initial screening process, he was 
also required to pass the PFT to gain entry to the NATP.45 One part of the PFT was 
the push-up test, requiring male trainees to complete thirty push-ups and female 
trainees fourteen push-ups.46 Although Bauer failed his first PFT, completing 
twenty-five pushups, he passed the first test on his second try.47 Once he was 
admitted to the NATP, he “passed all academic tests, demonstrated proficiency in 
his firearms and defensive tactics training, and met all expectations for the 
practical applications and skills components of the Academy.”48 However, despite 
his training successes, he failed the second PFT, completing 29 out of 30 push-
ups.49 Subsequently, Bauer brought suit in the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging 
that the FBI’s PFT represented sex-based cutoff scores, which violate Title VII.50 
 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id.; Mikhail Petrov, FBI’s Physical Fitness Test Can Have Different Requirements for Men and 
Women, WAKE FOREST L. REV. (Feb. 10, 2017), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2016/02/fbis-personal-
fitness-test-can-have-different-standards-for-men-and-women/.   
 43.  Hale v. Holder, No. 570-2007-00423x (E.E.O.C. Sept. 20, 2010). 
 44.  Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340, 344 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 372 (2016). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 345. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
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B. Physical Testing 
The FBI requires new agents to have not only certain intellectual and 
analytical abilities, but also physical abilities.51  To that end, the FBI administers 
the NATP: a multi-week program which helps train agents to adequately perform 
the duties required of their positions.52 Additionally, the program is designed to 
ensure that agents are fit to participate throughout the training, beyond the initial 
testing.53 
According to the FBI, physical fitness training is vital to the program because 
“a basic level of fitness and conditioning is essential for a NAT to perform at 
his/her best in all aspects of training and to successfully complete the entire fast-
paced training program without serious physical injury and undue mental 
stress.”54 Additionally, “a NAT’s level of fitness serves as a foundation for his/her 
ability to effectively apply principles and non-deadly force alternatives being 
taught in the program.”55 In other words, the program in its current form was 
developed because physically unfit trainees were increasingly sustaining injuries 
during the training.56 
When deciding which events to include in the PFT, the FBI relied on the 
Cooper Institute and a panel of experts, consisting of Supervisory Special Agents 
in the Training Division, who considered which events would most accurately and 
effectively measure the overall fitness needed to safely train for and perform the 
physical tasks of the training and job.57 Moreover, the FBI conducted a study with 
322 subjects from seven NATP classes to decide upon an appropriate minimum 
passing score. Given the observed differences in physical abilities between male 
and female trainees, the FBI enacted gender-normed standards, with the intention 
of holding both genders to equal standards of overall fitness.58 
Lastly, it is interesting to note that from 2004 to 2012, less than one percent of 
all trainees failed to pass the PFT, and there was no statistically significant 
difference in the passing rates for men and women.59 However, in regard to the 
pass points for push-ups specifically, if the thirty push-up standard for males was 
used to test both genders, females would be over seven times more likely to fail in 
any one attempt to pass the PFT.60 
C. District Court Opinion 
At trial, Bauer brought forth the argument that the FBI discriminated against 
male NATs by requiring them to do more push-ups than females to pass the PFT. 
The district court relied on two provisions to guide its analysis. 42 U.S.C.A. § 
 
 51.  Brief for Appellant at 7, Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340 (2016) (No. 14-2323). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 8.; supra note 2. 
 57.  Brief for Appellant at 7, Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340 (2016) (No. 14-2323). 
 58.  Id. at 10. 
 59.  Id. at 12. 
 60.  Id. 
MACRO FINAL FINAL (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  6:54 PM 
50 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 25:43 2017 
2000e-2(a)(1) provides that: 
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .” 
Additionally, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (l) states: 
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with 
the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or promotion, 
to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results 
of, employment related tests on the basis of . . . sex.” 
Agreeing with the plaintiff’s arguments, the district court looked next to the 
Supreme Court for guidance on how to analyze this relatively novel issue. The 
court analogized Bauer to Manhart and UAW v. Johnson Controls.61 In Manhart, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that while there are physical differences between 
males and females (average lifespan, for example), this did not serve as an 
adequate justification for the differential treatment with respect to payments into 
a pension fund.62 Thus, the Court held that disparate treatment discrimination 
may exist even if it is based on a “generalization that [is] unquestionably true.”63 
Moreover, to make this determination, the Court applied a “simple test” that 
makes a discrimination finding turn on “whether the evidence shows treatment of 
a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.”64 
Next, in Johnson Controls, an employer created a policy barring female 
employees capable of bearing children from jobs with a risk of lead exposure. The 
Supreme Court held that, even though the ability to have children is a clear 
physiological difference between the sexes, the policy was nevertheless facially 
discriminatory because it “create[d] a facial classification based on gender.”65 The 
“simple test” applied in these cases highlight the courts’ formal approach to 
equality: individual physical characteristics are irrelevant when making 
employment decisions, unless they are considered a bona fide occupational 
qualification.66 Thus, after comparing these cases to Bauer, this district court found 
that “the PFT clearly falls within § 2000e–2(a)(1)’s prohibition against 
discrimination on the basis of sex: plaintiff was treated in a manner which but for 
his sex would have been different.”67 
 
 
 61.  Bauer v. Holder, 25 F. Supp. 3d 842, 857 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated sub nom. Bauer v. Lynch, 812 
F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 62.  See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) (describing 
general differences between men and women). 
 63.  Id. at 707. 
 64.  Id. at 711. 
 65.  Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., v. Johnson Controls, 
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991). 
 66.  The Ideas of Equality and Non-Discrimination: Formal and Substantive Equality, EQUAL RIGHTS 
TRUST, equalrightstrust.org  (last visited Aug. 17. 2017).   
 67.  Bauer v. Holder, 25 F. Supp. 3d 842, 855 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated sub nom. Bauer v. Lynch, 812 
F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016). 
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In addition to applying the “simple test,” the district court also considered 
the arguments outlined by former Attorney General Holder. Specifically, the court 
considered the “unequal burden” test underscored in Gerdom, Powell, and Hale. 
However, the court could not see past the plain language of § 2000e–2(a)(1), which 
made it unlawful “to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such 
individual’s . . . sex.”68 Because this language seems to make no accommodation 
for physiological differences between men and women, the district court reasons 
that the “unequal burden” test violates statutory mandate.69  Moreover, the court 
contends that Gerdom directly contradicts the precedent set by Manhart.70 That is, 
the formal approach to equality proscribed in Manhart will find that discrimination 
exists when an individual is treated “in a manner which but for that person’s sex 
would be different,” even if that differential treatment is based on a 
“generalization that [is] unquestionably true.”71 As such, after the district court’s 
determination that men and women are subject to any different requirements, the 
inquiry effectively stops, as the policy is automatically discriminatory under Title 
VII. 
D. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion 
Unlike the district court, the court of appeals sought guidance from the 
limited case law that is directly on point. Specifically, the court looked to Powell 
and Hale, which specifically addressed, and approved of, the FBI’s use of gender-
normed standards for the PFT. Moreover, the court notes that in those cases, the 
judges relied heavily on Gerdom and the “unequal burden” test.72 Looking to 
Powell, the court of appeals highlights that the court rejected the proposition that 
female trainees had less stringent standards, and explained that “Title VII allows 
employers to make distinctions based on undeniable physical differences between 
men and women . . . where no significantly greater burden of compliance [is] 
imposed on either sex.”73 Furthermore, because physiological differences between 
the sexes “result in males and females of similar fitness levels performing 
differently on physical tests,”74 the FBI’s gender-normed standards simply 
accounted for those differences and, therefore, do not violate Title VII. 
Additionally, in Hale, the plaintiff also contended that the FBI held females to less 
rigorous physical requirements than males. The administrative law judge adopted 
the approach taken by the Powell court and recognized that “distinctions based on 
the obvious physical differences between men and women” do not per se violate 
Title VII.75 
Next, the court of appeals went to the root of the Powell and Hale decisions by 
examining Gerdom. As opposed to the district court, the court of appeals seemingly 
believed that the “unequal burdens” test could coincide with the plain language 
 
 68.  See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (1964). 
 69.  Bauer, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 857. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978). ,  
 72.  Bauer v. Holder, 812 F.3d 340, 348 (2016). 
 73.  Powell v. Reno, No. 96-2743, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24169 at *10 (D.D.C. July 24, 1997). 
 74.  Id. at 11. 
 75.  Id.  
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of sections §2000e-2(a)(1) and §2000e-2 (l); that is, that the FBI’s PFT does not lower 
the standards for women or raise the standards for men. Instead, the test measures 
overall fitness, and therefore treats men and women equally given their 
measurable physical differences. In fact, if the FBI were to have equal push-up 
requirements, women would suffer a disparate impact, as reaching thirty push-
ups is more burdensome for females. Moreover, if the bar were lowered, requiring 
both males and females to reach fourteen push-ups, women would still face a 
higher burden because men would not need to achieve the same level of overall 
fitness as women. Thus, the court of appeals departed from the district court’s 
formal approach to equality, and instead applied a substantive approach wherein 
a policy is judged on its ability to grant equal outcomes for disadvantaged 
groups.76 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the FBI’s gender-normed 
physical fitness benchmarks did not violate Title VII because they imposed equal 
burdens of compliance on men and women.77 
III. DECISION ON REMAND 
A.  Resolving Ambiguity Left by Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit instructed the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia to consider whether the gender-normed standards impose an “unequal 
burden” on male and female NATs. The FBI was successful in showing that the 
PFT “impose[s] an equal burden of compliance on both men and women, 
requiring the same level of physical fitness of each,”78 thus leading the court to 
grant summary judgment in favor of the FBI. 
The court’s reasoning helps establish a new standard for cases involving 
physical fitness employment tests. The Fourth Circuit, however, left ambiguous 
the process by which courts should interpret “burden.” In other words, whether 
“burden” should be examined in terms of economic, physical, or emotional 
hardships (or a culmination of all three) was left unclear.79 For example, when 
employment policies require male and female employees to maintain different 
grooming standards, the time, cost, and overall effort required to meet those 
standards are the considerations used in examining the relative burdens for each 
gender.80 Similarly, in the context of physical fitness testing, the burden imposed 
by the PFT could be examined by looking at the time and effort spent practicing 
push-ups, the cost of joining a gym or hiring a trainer, and the emotional 
expenditure needed to reach the requirements of the PFT.81 Thus, the lower court’s 
reasoning helps resolve the ambiguity left by the Fourth Circuit, and sets a new 
standard of analysis for future courts. 
On remand, the court did not openly discuss the ambiguity inherent in 
defining the term “burden.” The court, however, nevertheless underscored what 
approach it was taking: a statistical analysis of pass rates. The court notes that 
 
 76.  Supra note 66. 
 77.  Bauer v. Holder, 812 F.3d 340, 348–49 (2016). 
 78.  Id. at 351. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Supra note 12.  
 81.  Id. 
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Bauer’s argument fails because “[t]he only reliable way to attempt to select 
equivalent, gender-normed standards on a pushup test is to rely on metrics such 
as percentile ranks, based on either large databases or specific datasets. That is 
precisely what the FBI did here.”82 Thus, the court held that the studies conducted 
and relied upon by the FBI – which show that from 2004 to 2012, ninety-nine 
percent of both men and women passed the PFT (with no statistically significant 
difference between the sexes) – were sufficient to show that Bauer was not 
unequally burdened by the PFT.83 
This analysis of how to define “burden” is perhaps the most clear-cut solution 
to the ambiguity. Relying exclusively on data-metrics provides clarity for future 
employers and courts on how to judge whether an employment fitness policy is 
discriminatory. Although objective statistical measures likely require employers 
to hire outside consultants or research analysts to ensure that the fitness 
requirements lead to equal outcomes, such criteria promotes consistency in the 
courts. As such, the district court’s ruling underscores a reasonable interpretation 
of “burden,” and provides clear standards for establishing equal burdens. 
B. Easing Liability for Employers with Physical Fitness Requirements 
When implementing policy, employers sometimes face a Title VII “catch-22.” 
Employer action or inaction may result in discrimination allegations by a 
particular group; however, the alternative action is likely to disparately impact 
another group.  In Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009),  for example, the Supreme 
Court held that the New Haven Fire Department’s decision to throw out the results 
of a promotion test because minority candidates scored lower than white 
candidates violated Title VII. However, the Court noted that such action would be 
permissible if the employer could “demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, 
had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact 
statute.”84 While a disparate impact claim was not made in Bauer, the district 
court’s ruling nevertheless eases liability for employers who would otherwise be 
(1) faced with disparate-impact allegations arising from fitness standards that do 
not account for gender, or (2) forced to mount a Ricci defense when sued for having 
gender-normed fitness standards. 
If, upon remand, the district court had ruled that the FBI’s gender-normed 
PFT created unequal burdens, and therefore violates Title VII, employers would 
be forced to amend fitness policies to require men and women to achieve identical 
scores. Such policies subject employers to disparate-impact liability, as women, on 
average, are unable to meet the same physical fitness standards as men. As such, 
by declaring that gender-normed fitness standards do not violate Title VII, so long 
as statistical data suggests equal burdens, the court avoids a future string of Ricci 
cases. 
 
 82.  Bauer v. Sessions, No. 1:13 –cv–93 WL 2311748 (2017).  
 83.  Id. at 5.  
 84.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit set a new standard of analysis for gender-normed fitness 
testing, departing from the reasoning of the district court. With scarce case law on 
point, the district court in Bauer v. Holder relied on plain-meaning statutory 
interpretation to determine that the FBI’s gender-normed PFT was discriminatory. 
The “simple test” used by the lower court highlighted a formal approach to 
equality, deemphasizing considerations of the physiological differences between 
men and women. While the district court did not suggest that the FBI should have 
no fitness standards at all,85 nor that there exist better ways to determine fitness 
levels than gender-normed testing,86 the district court nevertheless ruled in favor 
of the plaintiff, concluding that Title VII clearly and strictly forbids this type of 
testing. In other words, the district court took a rigid interpretive approach, 
asserting that discrimination occurs when there is any difference in physical 
fitness requirements—and that difference is based on sex. 
However, the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by this argument. Instead, 
the court of appeals contended that case law supports the idea that inherent 
physiological differences may require different standards for men and women. 
Furthermore, the court’s analysis pointed to the assertion that true equality is 
substantive equality. That is, a policy is not discriminatory if it allows equal 
outcomes without imposing an unequal burden on a particular group. 
On remand, the district court was tasked with interpreting what the Fourth 
Circuit meant by “unequal burdens.” The court embraced a quantitative approach, 
relying primarily on pass-rate statistics to determine whether thirty push-ups for 
men represented the same burden as fourteen push-ups for women. Bauer 
provides newfound precedent for cases involving gender-normed fitness testing, 
and establishes a new standard of analysis for such cases. First, the Fourth Circuit 
does away with the “simple test” for analyzing gender-normed fitness standards, 
and contends that the “unequal burdens” analysis is appropriate for such cases. 
Next, on remand, the district court lays out a method for defining “burden.” That 
is, the district court relies on statistical data of pass rates between sexes, and uses 
it as evidence of equal or unequal burdens. 
Lastly, Bauer eases liability for employers with gender-normed fitness standards by reasoning that 
such standards do not pose unequal burdens so long as they are supported by statistical data. 
Ruling in the alternative would have prompted employers to adjust policies to require 
universal standards. Such policies would inevitably prompt disparate-impact allegations due 
to the physiological differences between the sexes. Thus, employers would be forced to (1) 
subject themselves to disparate-impact liability, or (2) mount a Ricci defense when sued for 
having gender-normed fitness standards. Bauer establishes the “unequal burdens” test as the 
appropriate test to use for employment-based fitness testing cases, and clarifies that statistical 
data is sufficient to demonstrate equal or unequal burdens. 
 
 85.  Brief for Appellant at 7, Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340 (2016) (No. 14-2323). 
 86.  Id.  
